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On the 1st of July, 1987, section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984 came into 
operation, allowing for the first time within the ordinary corpus of Irish criminal law 
for the detention and questioning of arrested suspects prior to charge.1 Under this 
provision, persons suspected of committing an arrestable offence2 could be detained 
initially for up to 6 hours3. A second period of six hours could then be authorised by a 
member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of superintendent if he had 
reasonable grounds for believing that such further detention was necessary for the 
proper investigation of the offence4. A total of twelve hours detention without charge 
was allowed. 
At the time, of course, the Offences Against the State Act, 1939 also allowed 
for detention without charge for offences covered by that Act or scheduled offences. 
The detention period allowed under section 30 of the 1939 Act amounted to a total of 
forty-eight hours: an initial period of twenty-four hours detention, which could be 
extended for a second twenty-four hour period under the authority of a member of the 
Garda Síochána not below the rank of Chief Superintendent.5 
Since then, there have been a number of significant advances in the power 
given to the gardaí to hold suspects for questioning. The first of these is the Criminal 
Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act, 1996 which introduced a potential period of detention 
of 168 hours, or seven days, for drug trafficking offences. Under section 2 of the 1996 
Act, an arrested suspect may initially be held for six hours, which may be extended by 
an additional period of eighteen hours by a member of the Garda Síochána not below 
the rank of chief superintendent where he has reasonable grounds to believe that such 
                                                 
1
 The introduction of this power was delayed until the promulgation of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984 
(Treatment of Persons in Custody in Garda Síochána Stations) Regulations, 1987. 
2
 Criminal Justice Act, 1984 s. 4 (1): an offence which has a possible sentence of five years or more 
severe penalty 
3
 Criminal Justice Act, 1984 s. 4 (3) (a) 
4
 Criminal Justice Act, 1984 s. 4 (3) (b)  
5
 The use of the detention powers under the 1939 Act in cases where there was no subversive element 
to the crime, and where the offence covered by that Act was but a minor concern of the gardaí when 
compared with other offences under investigation led to a number of interesting cases. These are 
outside the remit of this paper, however. See, for example, People (DPP) v Quilligan [1986] I.R. 495, 
[1987] I.L.R.M. 606. 
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detention is necessary for the proper investigation of the offence concerned6. Another 
period of twenty-four hours may then be added by a member of the same status, 
again, where he has reasonable grounds to believe that such further detention is 
necessary for the proper investigation of the offence7. Following this maximum period 
of forty-eight hours detention under the sole supervision of the gardaí, application 
must be made to a judge of either the District or the Circuit Court for any further 
detention of the suspect. Such application is to be made by a member of the Garda 
Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent and a warrant for a further period 
not exceeding seventy-two hours may be granted where the appropriate judge has 
reasonable grounds to believe that such further detention is necessary for the proper 
investigation of the offence concerned and that the investigation is being conducted 
diligently and expeditiously8. Another similar application may later be made and, 
under similar criteria as before, a judge may grant a warrant to detain the suspect for 
an additional forty-eight hours9.  
 The 1996 Act is the first legislative provision to allow for detention beyond 
forty-eight hours and it insists on the added safeguard of judicial authorisation for 
extended detention periods beyond that threshold. Furthermore, it is within the 1996 
Act for the first time that the concept of the investigation being conducted “diligently 
and expeditiously” is raised. The meaning of this phrase is not defined however and 
the manner in which the judge is to satisfy himself as to the diligence and 
expeditiousness of the garda investigation is not set out.  
 The second major advancement of garda powers to detain arrested suspects 
came within the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1998, which was 
enacted in the aftermath of the Omagh bombing and added to the period of detention 
permissible under its parent statute. It allowed that, following the maximum period of 
forty-eight hours detention under the sole authority of the Garda Síochána, a third 
period of twenty-four hours detention may be authorised by a judge of the District 
Court, upon application by a garda not below the rank of superintendent, if he has 
reasonable grounds for believing that such further detention is necessary for the 
proper investigation of the offence concerned and that the investigation is being 
                                                 
6
 s. 2 (2)(b) 
7
 s. 2 (2)(c) 
8
 s. 2 (2)(g) 
9
 s. 2 (2)(h) 
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conducted diligently and expeditiously10. The maximum period for which a suspect 
can be detained now under the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939-1998 is seventy-
two hours. It is notable that the provisions of the Offences Against the State Acts, 
1939-1998 are now also applicable to international terrorist groups and individuals by 
virtue of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005.11 
 The most recent adjustment to the garda powers of detention prior to charge 
came within the Criminal Justice Act, 2006 which amended section 4 of the 1984 Act. 
Section 4(3) of the 1984 Act was inserted by virtue of s. 9 of the Criminal Justice Act, 
2006 and it provides that a third period of detention may be sanctioned by a member 
of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent in relation to the 
detention of a person suspected of any arrestable offence. This period may last up to 
twelve hours and must only be sanctioned when the relevant member has reasonable 
grounds for believing that it is necessary for the proper investigation of the offence. 
The detention powers under the 1984 Act, as amended, now amount to a total of 
twenty-four hours. 
 The proposal under the 2007 Bill should be made clear at this juncture. It is 
proposed that a total of seven days detention without charge will be possible for those 
arrested on suspicion of committing one of the following offences: 
- a murder involving the use of a firearm or an explosive; 
- capital murder (e.g. murder of a member of An Garda Síochána); 
- possession of firearms; or, 
- false imprisonment involving the use of a firearm12 
The seven days would be authorised in the following manner: 
- an initial period of six hours detention; 
- a second period of eighteen hours detention, authorised by a member of the Garda 
Síochána not below the rank of superintendent where he has reasonable grounds for 
believing that such further detention is necessary for the proper investigation of the 
offence concerned; 
                                                 
10
 ss. 30 (4) and 30 (4A) of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, as inserted by s. 10 of the Offences 
Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1998. 
 
11
 It is also notable that the 1998 Amendment Act itself specified that certain provisiosn, including the 
extended detention provisions, would cease to be in operation on and from the 30th day of June, 2000, 
unless a resolution had been passed by each House of the Oireachtas resolving that that section should 
continue in operation. The relevant provisions have been renewed by Oireachtas resolution each year 
since then. 
12
 Section 50(1) of the Bill as passed by Dáíl Eireann 
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- a further period of twenty-four hours, authorised by a member of the Garda 
Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent where he has reasonable grounds 
for believing that such further detention is necessary for the proper investigation of 
the offence concerned; 
- a fourth period of detention for up to seventy-two hours, authorised by warrant of a 
judge of either the District of Circuit Court upon application to him by a member of 
the Garda Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent, where the member has 
reasonable grounds to believe that such further detention is necessary for the proper 
investigation of the offence concerned, and the judge is satisfied that such further 
detention is necessary for the proper investigation of the offence concerned and that 
the investigation is being conducted diligently and expeditiously; 
- and a fifth period of detention for up to forty-eight hours, authorised by warrant of a 
judge of either the District of Circuit Court upon application to him by a member of 
the Garda Síochána not below the rank of chief superintendent, where the member has 
reasonable grounds to believe that such further detention is necessary for the proper 
investigation of the offence concerned, and the judge is satisfied that such further 
detention is necessary for the proper investigation of the offence concerned and that 
the investigation is being conducted diligently and expeditiously.13 
 
In total then, a suspect arrested in relation to any of the offences covered by this 
provision could find himself in custody under the sole authority of the Garda 
Síochána for up to forty-eight hours and thereafter under the authority of the District 
or Circuit Court for one hundred and twenty hours, adding up to a total of 168 hours 
or seven days in detention. It would seem, though it is not entirely clear on the face of 
the 2007 Bill, that the rest period allowable for detained suspects between midnight 
and 8am would not be included in the reckoning of this 168 hours, and that, 
accordingly, a suspect might in reality find himself confined within the garda station 
for more than seven days. In fact, a suspect might conceivably find himself deprived 
of his liberty, in the custody of the Garda Síochána for a nine or ten days.14 
                                                 
13
 Section 50(3) of the Bill as passed by Dáil Eireann 
14
 e.g. suspect is arrested at 8pm on Monday night, at midnight (after four hours’ detention) a 
suspension notice is issued to cease at 8am. At 10am on Tuesday, the suspect’s detention is extended 
by a superintendent for another 18 hours which, including 8 hours sleep during which a suspension 
notice is in place, brings the detention through until 12pm on Wednesday. At that point a further period 
of twenty-four hours detention is authorised by a member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of 
chief superintendent. Allowing for another eight hour rest period, this detention will last until 8pm on 
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 One of the main criticisms of the proposed provision which has arisen is that 
little, if any, evidence has been put forward as to the necessity for the expansion of 
garda powers in this manner. On introducing the Bill, the Minister for Justice referred 
to gangland crime and suggested that the provisions of the Bill were aimed at dealing 
with such issues.15 Firstly, it ought to be pointed out that many of the provisions of 
the Bill, including inferences to be drawn from pre-trial silence (discussed below) are 
not confined to “gangland”-type offences, but are far broader in their application. 
Secondly, in relation to the extended detention periods applicable to the offences set 
out in section 50 of the Bill (murder involving a firearm, capital murder, possession of 
firearms, false imprisonment involving the use of a firearms or explosives) it is 
unclear what necessity there is for seven days detention or whether this is truly likely 
to have an impact on gangland crime.  
 In relation to the seven-day detention period provided for within the 1996 
Drug Trafficking legislation, a clear rationale was provided. It was stated, both at the 
time of the introduction of the Bill and at a later stage that such extended detention 
was necessary for two main reasons: firstly, the international nature of the organised 
drugs trade which can require enquiries to be made from various other countries 
which in some cases would not be practical in the more usual periods of detention 
allowed under Irish law; and secondly, to cope with the problem of people suspected 
of attempting to import drugs having ingested them (what are often referred to as 
“stuffers and swallowers”) where a considerable period might elapse before the drugs 
are excreted from the person's body.16 Even with this clear rationale, in their fact sheet 
on the 2007 Bill, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties suggested that the existing 
seven-day detention period available under the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) 
Act, 1996 is rarely, if ever, used.17 
                                                                                                                                            
Thursday night. At that point a period of seventy-two hours detention is authorised by a judge of the 
District Court, and allowing for five eight-hour sleep periods, this bring detention up to 10am on 
Tuesday. At that point the judge of the District Court authorises a final detention period of forty-eight 
hours which, allowing for three sleep periods of eight hours, in fact leads to release at 10am on Friday 
morning. This would amount to a total of 254 hours or more than ten and a half days. 
15
 See Press Release – available at 
http://www.justice.ie/80256E01003A02CF/vWeb/pcDOJA6YDMT9-en 
16
 See Response of the Irish Government to the report of the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) on its visit to Ireland from 31 
August to 9 September 1998, available at www.cpt.coe.int/documents/irl/1999-16-inf-eng.htm 
17
 See ICCL “What’s wrong with the Criminal Justice Bill, 2007?” Fact Sheet available at 
http://iccl.ie/DB_Data/publications/CJBFactSheet_FINAL.pdf 
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 It is unclear what rationale might apply to the extended detention provided for 
under the 2007 Bill and it is even less clear what the impact of such prolonged 
detention is expected to be. No study was carried out into the issue of gangland crime 
to assess whether or not such powers of detention for the gardaí are necessary. No 
green or white paper was prepared to allow for discussion of the challenges created by 
gangland crime and the potential methods of dealing with investigations of these 
kinds of offences. The Law Reform Commission were not asked to consider the 
possibilities for reform of the law in relation to the offences specified under Head 50 
of the Bill or the pre-trial processes associated therewith. No expert group was drawn 
together to consider whether or not there was a need for extended detention to be 
available in relation to particular types of offences or offenders, and if so what 
offences should be covered by such a provision. In fact, the main group working on 
the criminal justice system at the time of the initiation of the Bill, the Balance in the 
Criminal Law Review Group, was not asked to consider any issue in relation to 
detention periods generally. 
 Furthermore, with the Criminal Justice Act, 2006 barely up and running it is 
difficult to see how any study, had one been undertaken, could have taken stock of 
whether or not the provisions therein allowing an additional period of detention for all 
arrestable offences under section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984 ensured that 
detention periods were long enough to investigate such crimes fully, or needed to be 
longer for certain offences.  
 In the absence of any statistics or evidence to prove that crimes such as those 
listed in section 50 of the 2007 Bill necessitate a longer period of detention than other 
crimes, that investigations into such crimes have previously been irreparably 
hampered by the restrictive time-limits imposed to date, or that so called “gangland” 
criminals are more likely to co-operate with gardaí if held for longer, then questions 
must be asked as to the true rationale of the proposed legislation.  
 
Human Rights Obligations: Domestic and International 
Both the Irish Council for Civil Liberties and the Irish Human Rights Commission 
have expressed concerns that the Bill may lead Ireland to be in breach of International 
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human rights obligations.18 In this regard it is to be noted that the right to liberty is 
protected in international human rights documents such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (Article 9) and the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Article 5). It is also, of course, protected under Article 40.4.1 of the Irish 
Constitution. Generally, however, it is accepted that the right to liberty is not absolute 
and may be interfered with as prescribed by law, including a period of detention 
following a lawful arrest. 
 Whether or not seven days pre-trial detention can be said to be in breach of the 
right to liberty as expressed in the Constitution or the above-mentioned international 
human rights agreements is unclear. The Irish courts have certainly accepted the 
concept of legislative interference with the right to liberty and the existence of a pre-
trial period of detention for questioning of arrested suspects. Indeed, the European 
Court of Human Rights also accepts such interference, but insists on judicial control 
of the detention as a safeguard against arbitrary interference with the right to liberty.19 
 The fact that the 2007 Bill allows for judicial control from the forty-eight hour 
mark onwards would appear to ensure compliance with the right to liberty under the 
ECHR jurisprudence at least. The question of seven-day detention (or the more 
realistic nine/ten day detention) in and of itself has not been addressed by the 
European Court, however, so it is possible that in an appropriate case an argument 
might be made that seven-day detention per ce is excessive and may be in breach of 
Article 5.  
 
“Diligently and Expeditiously”  
Like the 1996 and 1998 Acts, the 2007 Bill provides an additional safeguard 
for arrested suspects by declaring that the judge authorising an extension of detention 
must reasonably believe not only that further detention is necessary for the proper 
investigation of the offence, but also that the investigation is being conducted 
“diligently and expeditiously”. This strengthens to a certain degree the level of 
protection being afforded to the accused’s right to liberty and such other rights as may 
be affected throughout the course of a garda investigation. However, these phrases 
                                                 
18
 See ICCL “What’s wrong with the Criminal Justice Bill, 2007?” Fact Sheet available at 
http://iccl.ie/DB_Data/publications/CJBFactSheet_FINAL.pdf and IRHC Observations on the Criminal 
Justice Bill, 2007 available at 
http://www.ihrc.ie/_fileupload/banners/ObservationsonCriminalJusticeBill20071.doc 
19
 See Brogan v United Kingdom (1988) 11 EHRR 117 
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have not, as yet, been tested to any great extent before the courts and it remains to be 
seen in what circumstances an extension sought by the gardaí might be denied on 
these grounds. 
 In People (D.P.P.) v O’Toole and Hickey20, a suspect had made inculpatory 
statements during the first six hour period of detention. A further period of detention 
was later authorised during which an identification parade was held. The argument on 
the part of the accused was that the second period of detention was unlawful as it was 
unnecessary for the “proper investigation of the offence” given the statements already 
made by the suspect. The Court of Criminal Appeal held, however, that the second 
detention period was lawful and had been correctly authorised by the member in 
question and the Court appeared to intimate that the phrase in question referred to that 
which was necessary for a full and proper investigation of the offence. Walsh has 
suggested that if the officer authorising the further period of detention is of the 
opinion that a further period is necessary for the proper investigation of the offence 
the courts will generally be slow to second-guess him21.  
The meaning of the phrase “diligently and expeditiously” as well as the 
circumstances in which it might be appropriate for a judge of the District or Circuit 
Court to deny an extension of detention due to an absence of diligence or 
expeditiousness is unclear. The phrase in question was first used in the English Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984. That Act, however, sets out precisely the procedure 
to be adopted in the analysis of whether or not an extended detention should be 
granted. Under section 43(14) of the Act, the information provided to the judge for 
consideration of the application for extended detention must include:  
- the nature of the offence for which the person to whom the application relates 
has been arrested;  
- the general nature of the evidence on which that person was arrested;  
- what inquiries relating to the offence have been made by the police and what 
further inquiries are proposed by them;  
- and the reasons for believing the continued detention of that person to be 
necessary for the purposes of such further inquiries. 
The precision of the English legislation in relation to this matter is admirable and it is 
submitted that greater clarification and guidance as to the operation of the Irish 
                                                 
20
 Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, July 20, 1990 
21
 Walsh, D. “Criminal Procedure” (Dublin 2002) p.233 
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legislation in this area is necessary, especially where the authorisation of detention 
may ultimately lead to a seven-day period of confinement in garda custody. 
 
Seven Days and the Law on Confessions 
 If a suspect who has been detained for seven days makes a statement 
inculpating himself in the alleged offence, how likely is it that a court will accept 
evidence of this statement at trial, under the law on confessions? The main point to be 
made in this regard is that only confessions voluntarily given will be accepted as 
evidence at trial. In recent times, the concept of voluntariness has come to include not 
only the traditional prohibition on threats or inducements22, but also a prohibition on 
oppression.23 Furthermore, the concept of oppression includes not only oppressive 
questioning, but oppression of circumstances. Oppression was defined in the English 
case of R v Priestly24 as “something which tends to sap and has sapped the free will 
which must exist before a confession is voluntary”.   
In People (D.P.P.) v Lynch25 the Supreme Court held that the suspect’s lack of 
sleep, his being in a strange environment, isolated from all he was accustomed to and 
being under constant garda surveillance of which he was aware led to circumstances 
of oppression which meant that the confession made by him could not be said to be 
free and voluntary. Other case law suggests that there is a subjective test to be applied 
in relation to oppression and that what may be oppressive to one person may not be so 
to another. In People (D.P.P.) v Pringle, McCann and O’Shea26, for example, the 
Court of Criminal Appeal held that as the suspect was a 42 year old fisherman who 
was an experienced man of the world and was not unused to conditions of physical 
hardship, it was open to the trial court to find that his will would not have been 
undermined by the interview he had experienced or by lack of sleep. The fact that the 
accused had had five visits from his solicitor who advised him to remain silent also 
appeared to make an impression on the Court. O’Higgins C.J. expressed the opinion 
that “those visits and the advice he obtained must have strengthened his resolve and 
                                                 
22
 See cases such as A.G. v McCabe [1927} I.R. 129; People (D.P.P.) v Hoey Unreported, Supreme 
Court, 16 December 1987 
23
 See People (D.P.P.) v Breathnach (1981) 2 Frewen 43 later affirmed in the Supreme Court in People 
(D.P.P.) v Lynch [1982] I.R. 64; People (D.P.P.) v Pringle, McCann and O’Shea (1981) 2 Frewen 57 
24
 (1965) 50 Cr. App. Rep. 183; [1966] Crim. L.R. 507 This definition was cited with approval by the 
Court of Criminal Appeal in People (D.P.P.) v Pringle, McCann and O’Shea (1981) 2 Frewen 57 
25
 [1982] I.R. 64 
26
 (1981) 2 Frewen 57 
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assisted in counteracting any weakness of will which the conditions of his custody and 
the questioning by the Gardaí may have produced”. 
 It is possible to suggest that a period of seven days detention could be seen as 
oppressive in some, if not in many, circumstances, and that such a conclusion might 
lead to the exclusion of any confession obtained from the accused, thus defeating part 
of what might be the unexpressed rationale of the detention provision in the first 
place. Perhaps on the basis of Pringle it is possible also to suggest that unless a 
suspect has regular access to a solicitor while detained under the provisions of section 
50 of the 2007 Bill for a maximum of seven days, there is at least a danger that 
statements made by him would be inadmissible at trial due to oppression and 
involuntariness. The right of access to a solicitor in Ireland however, may not be able 
to rise to this challenge given the lack of duty solicitor schemes among other factors. 
 
Right to a Solicitor 
The pre-trial right of reasonable access to legal advice was recognised as 
having constitutional status in People (D.P.P.) v Healy27 and the rationale for its 
protection were stated in that case as being two-fold: firstly to ensure that the suspect 
is aware of this legal rights and that accordingly any statement made by him is more 
likely to be voluntary; and secondly to redress to some extent the imbalance of power 
between the State and the suspect in the pre-trial period. While the right is 
constitutionally protected, it has been expressed as a right of “reasonable access” 
only. In practice, this is said to amount to consultation between legal adviser and 
detained suspect for approximately ten minutes in every hour of detention, or one 
hour in every six hours of detention.28 Furthermore, it has been held that a legal 
adviser is not entitled to be present throughout garda interrogation of a suspect. This 
was stated, bluntly, in the case of Lavery v Member-in-Charge, Carrickmacross 
Garda Station,29 a case which involved the operation of the inference-drawing 
provisions of the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1998.  
It is clear that the definition of the right to pre-trial legal advice in Ireland is 
quite limited. Furthermore, there are no duty solicitor schemes in operation within the 
jurisdiction which can lead to difficulties in the provision of legal advisers to detained 
                                                 
27
 [1990] 2 I.R. 73. 
28
 White, J.P.M. “The Confessional State – Police Interrogation in the Irish Republic” Part I [2000] 10 
(1) I.C.L.J. pp.17–18. 
29
 [1999] 2 I.R. 390. 
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suspects.30 Finally, while the Garda Station Legal Advice Scheme has ameliorated the 
situation in relation to provision of legal advice for impecunious suspects, it remains 
an administrative scheme only with restrictive means-tested limits on entry.31  
 
Right to silence 
Part IV of the 2007 Bill as passed by Dáil Eireann proposes certain amendments to 
existing legislation allowing for inferences to be drawn from silence, repeal of other 
inference-drawing provisions32 and the addition of a new provision in this regard. The 
new provision proposed would be inserted into the Criminal Justice Act, 1984 as 
section 19A and would be applicable to suspects detained in relation to all arrestable 
offences. Section 19A would allow for such inferences as appear proper to be drawn 
at trial from the accused’s failure to mention any fact, when he is being questioned, 
charged or informed that he might be charged with a particular offence, which he later 
relies on in his defence at trial. Inferences can only be drawn where the accused has 
been told in ordinary language that it may harm the credibility of his defence if he 
does not mention when questioned, charged or informed, something which he later 
relies on in court. The 2007 Bill also adds additional safeguards to the process of 
drawing adverse inferences under section 19A:  
- no inference ought to be drawn unless the accused was afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to consult with a solicitor before his failure to account for the 
relevant matters or to mention the relevant fact occurred; 
- no inference ought to be drawn in relation to a question asked in an interview 
unless either the interview has been electronically recorded or the detained 
person has consented in writing to the non-recording of the interview; 
- and, the court or jury in deciding whether or not to draw inferences ought to 
consider when the account or fact concerned was first mentioned by the 
accused.  
All of these safeguards are welcome given the added protection which they offer to 
the suspect both in the pre-trial period and at later trial. In particular, the inclusion of a 
statutory provision expressly stating that a detained suspect must be afforded a 
                                                 
30
 see Daly, Y.M. “Does the Buck Stop Here?: An Examination of the Pre-Trial Right to Legal Advice 
in light of O’Brien v D.P.P.” (2006) 28 D.U.L.J. 345. 
31
 In order to be eligible for the Scheme a detained suspect must either be in receipt of Social Welfare 
payments, or earning less than €20,316 per annum. 
32
 Repeal of section 7 of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act, 1996 and section 5 of the 
Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1998 
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reasonable opportunity to consult with a solicitor before any inferences will be 
allowable from his silence in the pre-trial period is a welcome measure and an 
admirable reflection of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
which has always emphasized the connection between the right to silence and the 
right of access to counsel.33 
However, it is submitted that the wording of the proposed section 19A may 
cause difficulties in practice. The proposed section provides that inferences may be 
drawn from the accused failure to mention “a fact which in the circumstances existing 
at the time clearly called for an explanation from …” the accused.34  
A provision largely similar to this in England and Wales has led to much 
controversy in both the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights. 
Section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994 provides that 
inferences may be drawn at trial from the failure of the accused to mention a fact 
which he later relies on in his defence which in the circumstances existing at the time 
(during pre-trial interrogation or charging etc) he could reasonably have been 
expected to mention. The difficulty which has come to the fore in relation to this 
provision is the claims of suspects that the only reason they failed to mention the 
relevant fact during the pre-trial period was because their solicitor had advised them 
to remain silent. The question which has arisen is whether it can be said to be 
reasonable in the circumstances as they existed at the time for the accused to have 
mentioned the fact, despite the advice which he claims to have received from his legal 
advisor at that time. Obviously this gives rise to certain difficulties. On the one hand, 
if it is considered unreasonable to expect a detained suspect to answer police 
questions where he claims that his legal adviser has told him to remain silent, then in 
every case where the suspect claims that this is what occurred he will be able to 
circumvent the operation of the legislation and the drawing of any adverse inference 
against him. On the other hand, if a detained suspect truly does rely upon the advice 
received from his legal adviser to remain silent and that is the only reason that he did 
not mention the fact later relied on in his defence at the earlier time, is it fair to draw 
an adverse inference against him, or would the operation of section 34 in those 
circumstances amount to an unfair trial? 
                                                 
33
 See for example Murray v United Kingdom (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 29. 
34
 Head 30 of the 2007 Bill as passed by Dáil Eireann 
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It is submitted that the proposed section 19A may well give rise to similar 
difficulties in the Irish courts. If the detained suspect is given, and indeed must be 
given access to his solicitor under the provisions of the Act, and also as a 
constitutional rights, and relies upon advice given to him by such solicitor to remain 
silent, can an inference fairly be drawn against him at later trial for his failure to 
mention the relevant fact? Even though the Irish incarnation of the inference-drawing 
provision appears to side-step the dangers of the English experience referring to a fact 
which “clearly calls” for an explanation rather than a fact which it was “reasonable” 
to mention in the circumstances, it is submitted that the difficulty could still arise. If a 
solicitor advises his client to remain silent, surely it is possible that that client may 
consider that the fact in question could not “clearly call” for an explanation, or his 
solicitor would have advised him to mention and explain it. 
In England, the conclusion which has been reached, through various cases in 
the domestic courts35 and the European Court of Human Rights36, is that a judge must 
direct a jury to consider both the genuineness of the accused’s reliance on legal advice 
and the reasonableness of such reliance in deciding whether or not to draw an 
inference against the accused for his failure to mention a fact later relied on in his 
defence. 
 
Potential Difficulties for the Irish Criminal Justice System37 
Generally, it should be noted that a defence to a criminal charge is a legal 
construct. Defences such as self-defence, provocation, duress, insanity and so on have 
legal meanings which may not be readily apparent to the layman. It seems harsh then 
to place a burden upon a suspect in garda custody to mention at that point any fact 
which he thinks may be of relevance to a later defence. At this point he may not be 
aware of what sort of a defence might be appropriate in his case and he may have no 
idea what sort of facts would form a primary part of that defence. Expecting the 
suspect in the garda station to mention all such facts or to hold it against him for 
failing to do so is arguably overly burdensome. 
                                                 
35
 e.g. R v Betts and Hall [2001] 2 Cr. App. R. 257; R v Howell [2005] 1 Cr. App. R. 1; R v Hoare and 
Pierce [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1804, [2005] 1 Cr. App. R. 22; R v Beckles [2005] 1 W.L.R. 2829, [2005] 1 All 
E.R. 705 
36
 See Condron v U.K. (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 1; Beckles v U.K. (2002) 36 E.H.R.R. 162 
37
 For a further analysis of the proposed section 19A and the difficulties which it might pose for the 
Irish criminal justice system see Daly, Y.M. “Silence and Solicitors: Lessons Learned from England 
and Wales?” in the next edition of the Irish Criminal Law Journal (forthcoming, May 2007) 
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 In the Irish context also there is a further complication. While the accused 
might be provided a “reasonable opportunity” to consult with his solicitor in the early 
stages of his detention and the solicitor may advise him of the facts which he will 
need to make clear to the gardaí in light of a particular defence which the solicitor 
deems potentially relevant to the case, the Irish courts have not seen fit to recognise a 
broader right to legal advice, encompassing a right for the solicitor to be present 
throughout interrogation. If questioning were to take a turn in a new, previously 
unforeseen direction and the solicitor was not present to advise, at that point the 
suspect would again be burdened with the need to consider what facts might form part 
of a defence, the important legal elements of which are unknown to him. Furthermore, 
in the absence of duty solicitor schemes within this jurisdiction, not every suspect 
detained in a garda station gains access to legal advice in the first place. Whether or 
not the safeguards provided for in section 19A necessitate the creation of such 
schemes is unclear. It would seem, however, that an argument could be made that 
section 19A combined with the potential for seven days detention under the 2007 Bill 
necessitates a more comprehensive right to legal advice to be recognised in Ireland 
than that which has been so far accepted.  
 
Conclusion 
While the 2007 Bill introduces safeguards within its provisions to prevent abuse in the 
pre-trial process, it is submitted that they are not enough to balance the scales against 
the powers being given to the gardaí and the interference with the rights of suspects 
contained therein. Once again, the legislature is moving the centre of gravity of the 
Irish criminal process from the courts to the garda station. 
 
